It should be noted that at the root of the question lies the paradox of strategic nuclear defense. The answer tenured in this essay therefore rests on the logic of this paradox and should be understood as such. The paradox of strategic nuclear defense is simple; the political objectives of governments require strategic plans so destructive that they no longer serve the political objectives they were designed for. To begin this essay it would be expedient to examine what the
In 1957 the government of the
The strategy of SAC to overdestroy Moscow and by extension the rest of the communist world can be accurately descried as proportionate for two reasons; firstly the commitment to the political objectives of the cold war were high. Secondly, Clausewitzian strategic logic demands the maximum use of force to guarantee the imposition of your will upon the enemy.
In the first case the, acceptance of
In the second place Clausewitian logic condones SAC’s strategy as a propionate and correct use of force. Clausewitz clarifies how much force should be applied; ‘…the political object, as the original motivation for the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of military force and also the amount of effort to be made’[4] It is assumed that always the aim in war is to disarm your enemy, likewise your enemy will always aim to disarm you, therefore in logical conception war will always tend to the extreme. The specific means of nuclear war demand that any use of force be maximum available. This logic pushes any nuclear strategy towards the purist conception of war, and therefore in Clausewitian terms SAC’s plan to overdestroy
The paradox of nuclear defense is evident in the statements above. As Clausewitz states war is a continuation of policy of by other means. If it is understood that both the
It is a further irony to note that the greater the level of strategic planning for a nuclear war and implementation of planning through acquisition of nuclear weapons, the greater the understanding of the consequences of such action. This leads to nuclear war becoming less likely. The logic behind this is simple, a greater understanding of the consequences of nuclear war leads to an understanding that it does not serve political objectives. The evidence for nuclear war being avoided because it does not serve political objectives can be seen in the avoidance of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis, the SALT talks and the continued nuclear peace today. By planning to overdestroy
The paradox of nuclear defense does not nullify the foreign policy objectives of Eisenhower’s administration. It could be argued that the paradox of nuclear defense furthered the
The fundamental question of why Eisenhower chose to adopt a policy of Massive Retaliation and the resulting SAC plan to overdestroy
It is revealing to ask what would have happened to the
[1] NSC 162/2 original document, http://www.jan.vandercrabben.name/nsc/index.php bottom of the first page
[2]http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/NC/nh2_1.gif and http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/NC/nh2_2.gif
[3]Carl von Clausewitz, trs. Colonel J.J. Graham. ‘On War’, Barnes and Noble Publishing,
[4] Ibid. p. 8
[5] L. Freedman ‘The evolution of nuclear strategy’, Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies , 1989, Basingstoke/London p.78
[6] NSC 162/2 original document, http://www.jan.vandercrabben.name/nsc/index.php top of the sixth page
[7] Rosemary J. Foot ‘Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict (in Truman, Eisenhower, and the Uses of Atomic Superiority)’ 1988, International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3. p1
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